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American legal treatises on the common law fall into two
classes-state books and books treating of the common law of all
the states. State books, faithfully written, serve a useful pur-
pose, for they are more complete than the best state digest; besides,
they deal with their respective subjects from a different point of
view. The digester aims to state correctly the principles decided
in a case, perhaps the facts also; the writer aims to present
principles in an orderly manner; in other words, to combine them
into a system. Direct legal improvement is no concern of his, for
he can hardly hope to modify any principle by showing how con-
trary it may be to that held by the courts of other states, since the
maxim store decisis still remains the strongest light in the tor-
tuous channel of state and federal jurisprudence. 1Nrevertheless,
it is his duty to show clearly the points of similarity or dissimilarity
of the decisions within his own field, thus rendering the existing
system more luminous. His work, if well done, yields a true re-
ward, for, though he cannot aspire to become directly a molder
of the law, yet by reconciling seeming incongruities, or by expos-
ing those not previously discovered, he can prepare the way for
improving the law by judicial or legislative action.
The writer who attempts to unfold the common law of all the
states on a particular topic has before him a very different task.
If he aims to produce a work essentially exhaustive he traverses
the field of comparative jurisprudence. The principal defect of
many of the modern law books falling within this class is, they
do not regard the subject from this point of view, are incomplete,
and consequently do not possess the same authority as the older
books in their day. It is true that, when Story wrote, he was not
thinking of writing works on comparative jurisprudence; never-
theless it was not difficult for him to examine every decision ly-
ing within the field of his particular inquiry; in effect, therefore,
he pursued this method. In any event, the reader felt assured that
the subject had been presented in its completeness, hence he was
justified in regarding the writer as a trustworthy guide.
With the rapid increase of decisions, recent writers, with a few
exceptions, despairing of attaining similar completeness, have con-
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tented themselves with presenting, as they supposed, the more
important principles fortified with some references, without much
or any thought of the question how the principles were regarded
in different jurisdictions. The comparative method has not been
observed, and so the worth of their -productions, measured by those
of earlier authors, has steadily declined in usefulness and authority.
Their books are often but little more than a digest of a particular
subject, with a better arrangement of the principles, but without
the merit even of the completeness of a digest.
An illustration may be given to show more clearly the nature
of this method, and its weakness. Recently a work appeared on
the subject of receivership, in which the writer stated that a
foreign receiver could not sue for an unpaid subscription. The
writer cited a Nebraska case to which he might have added
another from the Supreme Court of Iowa. But he overlooked
a large number of decisions clearly establishing the opposite rule.
If a lawyer in Nebraska should seek to learn whether any rule had
been declared in his state, he would discover the correct rule;
while a lawyer in Massachusetts who should consult the book on
a similar quest would be led astray.
Many of our modern books abound in these imperfections.
Consequently there is danger in using them as authorities for new
rules in states where none exist. There is no certainty that the
rule found in one of them is the last rule, or is maintained by the
larger number of states, for the author does not usually profess
to have used the exhaustive, comparative method, but only pro-
fesses that the principles stated are sustained by his citations. -
Does anyone doubt the successful employment of the com-
parative method? Perfection is not expected, but with the excel-
lent digests, both state and national, now existing, it is practicable
to collect and compare all the cases dealing with.the same matter
and the different rules embedded in them. The preparation of such
books, of course, requires more labor and closer study, but is within
the range of achievement. Many writers, seemingly, after choosing
their field dare go no further than to select such principles as
can be easily fortified by adequate citations. They dare not col-
lect all the cases pertaining to a topic, discriminate between the
rules delivered, and pronounce a judgment, founded on reasons,
in favor of the rule more worthy of adoption. Rather than under-
take the labor of doing this, or run the risk of falling into error,
they abdicate the high position they might occupy as authorities
establishing legal principles in states where none exist.
Of course a writer may, notwithstanding the keenest search,
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overlook principles, or may intentionally omit them because they
lie, in his opinion, outside the boundary of his field of inquiry. But
whatever principles are within his ken should be examined by
the light of the comparative method, for then, if his work is well
done, the reader will be assured that he is in possession of the
truth he is trying to learn, while by the old method he simply knows
that he has learned something, the rule in one or more states,
without knowing whether it is the most general or better rule that
has been perfected and applied.
To this one may reply: "Cannot a judge be satisfied with the
rule as disclosed by the courts of one or two states without know-
ing more?" Yes, sometimes they are too easily satisfied. Some
courts rely largely for new rules on the decisions of the courts
perhaps of a single state, much older and worthy of high regard.
Again, a judge may be satisfied with the rule established by al-
most any decision which he believes to be based on sound reasoning.
Yet how often have such precedents proved to be faulty, judged by
the light of later discoveries! How often has the joy in estab-
lishing a new rule turned into regret after gaining a better knowl-
edge from the study of other cases than those known at the time
of rendering the decision.
There is, then, greater need for books based on the comparative
method. The modern reviewing judge in most of the states is a
hard worker with but little time for studying cases outside those
mentioned in brief or argument. When one examines the great var-
iety of cases collected in a small volume of modem reports, and con-
siders the short time given for their presentation to the court
and its subsequent study of them, he should be agreeably surprised in
finding so many luminous deliverances. But he will also note
great differences. And the reason often is, the luminous opinion
is founded on a thoroughly prepared brief strengthened by an in-
forming argument, while the imperfect, disappointing opinion is
the outcome of reverse circumstances. Doubtless many an opin-
ion has been prepared with the consciousness that the subject was
not well understood, but the author had not more time to bestow
on its preparation, while occasionally an opinion betrays a sad com-
prehension of the importance of the question in controversy, or
the correct answer. To those who are thus in quest of knowledge
a law writer who is properly qualified for his task fhould be a
welcome helper. He ought to know more about his subject, which
he has especially studied, than any judge or lawyer, and therefore
can rightfully and modestly claim to be the teacher of all others.
And if he has not thus mastered it, and acquired a much better under-
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
standing of it than others, he ought not to add another book of
the old-fashioned kind to the over-burdened literature now existing.
The writer, therefore, on comparative jurisprudence, who
brings to his task proper qualifications and produces the needful
kind of book will render a constantly increasing service to bar
and bench, and more than regain the height formerly occupied by
legal writers. If his deductions can never be as weighty with
the court as were the responsa prudentium of the Roman lawyers
with the przetors, yet he can always be one of the strong and wel-
come lights illuminating the judicial pathway. And the more com-
plex our jurisprudence, the greater is the need of expert or special
study of its different branches. Nor is there any reason for
doubting the worth of the researches of any expert who truly
achieves his task. Doubtless the writing of many of the state books
has grown out of the inability or fear to produce those of the kind
described. The cases may indeed become so numerous pertaining
to a subject that no one can become master of them; but that time
is not yet.
To produce a book of the highest utility on a branch of the com-
mon law, the writer can do something more than present narrowly
the decisions. These are binding rules in the states where they
were rendered; in other states they are simply reasons to the judi-
cial mind. The law writer who is treating them comparatively
regards them in a double aspect; for the citizen of the state
wherein they were delivered they are formal declarations or rules
of law, and in collecting, arranging and reproducing them the
writer acts as a recorder; for the courts or citizens of other states
they are not rules in any sense, but simply reasons; worthy, it
may be, of conversion into rules whenever the proper occasion for
doing so shall arise. Consequently a court in one state does not
recognize any requirement to adopt the rules established in another
state,. except as evidence of the law in that state. In other regards
its rules are reasons; often very weighty, fit for adoption by another
jurisdiction. While the courts thus deal with the rules of other
states, too often the law writer hesitates or neglects to regard
them in the latter aspect, thereby impairing the usefulness of his
work. He fails to sift and classify conflicting decisions, through
fear perhaps that he does not understand them, and will put
them into the wrong category. Of course, this criticism does
not apply to all law writers; some of them clearly show a mastery
of their subject, and do not fear to classify conflicting decisions
and to deduce from these the better or more general rule.
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As the common law rules established in every state are only
reasons in other states for establishing similar rules, why should
not statutes be thus regarded and considered also by the compar-
ative law writer? Thus in most of the states both by common law
and statute the holder of a check cannot sue the drawee bank unless
it has promised to pay. In four states the opposite rule pre-
vails. The latter rule has been recently superseded by statute in
several states, and doubtless the former will ultimately become uni-
versal. In several of the newer states no rule has yet been adopted,
but doubtless will be in the near future. In presenting to the court
in one of these states the reasons for establishing the more general
rule, why should not the statutes embodying it, showing the
legislative, representative will, have quite as much or more
weight than the decisions of courts representing the judicial will?
Is it not as clearly within the province of the law writer to pre-
sent the statutes establishing or superseding a common-law rule,
as the legal decisions?
Again, a common-law rule is often superseded by a statute of
which the writer takes no notice. The rule has been swept
away; surely this fact is worth giving to one who is trying to find
out what the rule is and how generally it exists. By thus stating
the rule and ignoring its supersedure, the law writer is without
excuse for leading his reader astray. It is just as easy to exam-
ine statutes as reports; only more time is required to complete the
enterprise. And, after all, is not this the principal reason for
producing so many imperfect books, the atithor's unwillingness or
lack of patience to devote the time needful to write better ones?
Of late, another kind of book is appearing, in which complete-
nest of citation is the author's goal. Such works are supposed to
be especially valuable to the brief-maker as a quarry, to, which
he can go and find ore. Many of the citations massed bear in-
directly on the principle, yet by the method are rightfully in-
cluded. Doubtless these works have a real use, but are still
wanting in the comparative idea, the sifting of cases, putting
them under their proper classifications and evolving from them
the better rules. They may serve as authorities for the rules
stated; they are still lacking in the higher critical elements.
Lastly, excellent as are many of our law schools, can they
not break into new ground by dealing with a larger number of the
unsettled questions than they now do? Doubtless some instructors
would say: "It is our business to teach law students the leading
or most general principles." But ought the work of instruction
to stop with their presentation? Many of the conflicting rules are
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of frequent application, and therefore it would seem that the stu-
dent ought, if possible, to have some knowledge of them. The con-
flict has grown out of their constant application. Cannot the
comparative method be applied to the examination and presentation
of many of these questions, to the obvious profit of those who
attend these institutions?
Albert S. Bolles.
